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Abstract: The imperative need for unconditional secure key exchange is expounded by the
increasing connectivity of networks and by the increasing number and level of sophistication
of cyberattacks. Two concepts that are theoretically information-secure are quantum key
distribution (QKD) and Kirchoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN). However, these concepts
require a dedicated connection between hosts in peer-to-peer (P2P) networks which can be
impractical and or cost prohibitive. A practical and cost effective method is to have each
host share their respective cable(s) with other hosts such that two remote hosts can realize
a secure key exchange without the need of an additional cable or key exchanger. In this
article we analyze the cost complexities of cable, key exchangers, and time required in the
star network. We mentioned the reliability of the star network and compare it with other
network geometries. We also conceived a protocol and equation for the number of secure bit
exchange periods needed in a star network. We then outline other network geometries and
trade-off possibilities that seem interesting to explore.
Keywords: KLJN; QKD; networks; star network; secure key exchange; information
theoretically secure; unconditional security
1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation for a Secure Network
In the advent of intelligent vehicle information networks [1], the smart power grid [2], and the Internet
of Things (IoT) [3], current infrastructure is becoming increasingly dependent on cyber networks.
This dependency makes current infrastructure a larger more attractive target for cyberattacks, such that
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the National Security Agency (NSA) director stated the U.S. power grid could be shut down with a
cyberattack [4].
Secure communication channels are needed to prevent eavesdropping or intervention. Increasingly
though, communications is directed away from expensive, dedicated networks in favor of the open
internet. In order to ensure secure communications, security keys are needed to set up a secure
communication. The keys are generated, and shared via a publicly accessible channel by secure key
distribution protocols. Consider a secure key exchange between Alice and Bob, Alice and Bob must
consider that an eavesdropper (Eve) is trying to extract the key as illustrated in Figure 1. Secure key
exchanges can be categorized as either software-based or hardware-based.
Figure 1. An illustration of Alice and Bob in a secure key exchange while Eve is seeking to
tap the communication channel and extract the key.
Software-based key exchanges are based on mathematical algorithms with the assumption that
Eve does not have enough computing resources to crack the key. In essence, software-based key
exchanges offer no security from an information theoretical point of view. The security is only
(computationally-) conditional and is not future-proof, meaning that with enough computing resources
the key can be extracted. The advantages of software-based key exchanges are the low cost, hardware
communicator is not required, and the keys can be exchanged over the Internet, thus eliminating the need
of extra infrastructure. The other option is hardware-based key exchange, these offer an advantage of
unconditional security.
1.2. Hardware-Based Secure Key Exchanges
The Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [5] and the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) [6–26]
secure key exchange are two examples of hardware-based secure key exchange concepts that are
information theoretically secure [27]. Thus, even with infinite computing resources the key will not
be extracted by Eve, because the security offered by these schemes are based on fundamental laws
of physics, to crack the key exchange would require Eve to break the underpinning laws of physics.
The main disadvantage of hardware-based key exchanges is the higher cost, as they require a physical
communicator at each host, and a dedicated connection between communicators. Such communication
schemes can be considered peer-to-peer (P2P) [28].
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The QKD key exchange utilizes the quantum no-cloning theorem of quantum mechanics [5] to
distribute key bits. In theory it is information theoretically secure; however, the physical implementation
of QKD has been debated and the method has been hacked [29–32].
The KLJN key exchange utilizes the laws and properties of classical mechanics [6] to generate and
distribute key bits. In the KLJN key exchange depicted in Figure 2, Alice and Bob have two identical
resistor pairs, RL and RH (the values of the resistors are such that RL < RH) which represents the low
RL and high RH bits respectively. At the beginning of each bit exchange period, the communicators
randomly generate a bit value and connect the corresponding resistor to the wire line. The effective
value of the resulting thermal noise in the cable has three possible levels. When it is at the intermediate
level, Alice and Bob will know that the other party has the opposite bit value than their own. Thus, a
secure bit exchange took place because Eve, while she also knows that Alice and Bob have opposite bit
values, she does not know who has the RL value and who has the RH value [6,8].
Figure 2. An illustration of a Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) system. Alice and Bob
each have a communicator which have noise generators, a low resistorRL, and a high resistor
RH. The noise voltages are enhanced by Johnson noise UA,L or UA,H for Alice; and UB,L or
UB,H for Bob, which is measured between the wire and the ground. Once the communicators
select a resistor they measure the mean-squared voltage amplitude < U2ch(t) > and or the
current amplitude < I2ch(t) >.
1.3. Secure Key Exchange over P2P Networks and the Fully Connected Network
Hardware-based key exchanges require P2P networks with a dedicated connection to each host. For
very large networks this will be costly due to the infrastructure (cables) and key exchangers. The cost
complexity of the growth for different networks can be denoted by Tcable(N) for number of cables,
Tke(N) for number of key exchangers, and Ttime(N) for amount of time required or speed to complete a
secure bit exchange, with N representing the number of hosts in the network.
A simple method to construct P2P networks is a fully connected network also known as the complete
graph in graph theory. The fully connected network is illustrated in Figure 3. The fully connected
network does not require a protocol since every host in the network has a dedicated connection with
every other host in the network, and can process a secure bit exchange with any other host at any time
simultaneously. This network has N − 1 key exchangers per host and scales with the order of N2
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for cables and key exchangers, which makes this network impractical for very large networks. The
complexities are Tcable(N) ∈ O(N2), Tke(N) ∈ O(N2), and Ttime(N) ∈ O(1). We will denote the fully
connected network with N − 1 key exchangers per host as FCNN−1. The fully connected network has
N −1 key exchangers for every host resulting in (N −1) ·N total key exchangers for the entire network,
N − 1 direct connections for every host resulting in (N − 1) · N/2 total cables for the entire network.
The advantage the fully connected network has is time, as every host in the network can simultaneously
process a secure bit exchange with every other host in the network.
Figure 3. An illustration of a fully connected network with N − 1 communicators per
host (denoted as FCNN−1) has complexities of Tcable(N) ∈ O(N2), Tke(N) ∈ O(N2), and
Ttime(N) ∈ O(1).
If the cost of having (N − 1) ·N key exchangers for the entire network is too costly, then a trade-off
between the number of key exchangers and speed might be preferable. If there is only one key exchanger
per host in the fully connected network then the complexities for the fully connected network will be;
Tcable(N) ∈ O(N2), Tke(N) ∈ O(N), and Ttime(N) ∈ O(N), and will require a protocol which we will
denote as FCN1 to process a secure bit exchange with every host in the network.
The fully connected network is robust and reliable as it does not depend on a single cable or key
exchanger. If there is cable destruction or a damaged key exchanger then only the hosts connected by
that cable or key exchanger will be affected, and only that connection will be affected. The affected hosts
will still be able to process a secure bit exchange with other hosts which do not depend on the damaged
cable or key exchanger.
To add additional hosts to the fully connected network will be trivial since it does not have a protocol.
In the case of FCN1 the protocol will need to consider the added host.
1.4. Linear Chain Network with Two Key Exchangers per Host
Linear chain networks also know as bus networks or daisy chain networks, contain a single line and
two key exchanges per host as illustrated in Figure 4, and were analyzed in [33] in the contexts of smart
grids. The linear chain network with 2 key exchangers per host has complexities of Tcable(N) ∈ O(N),
Tke(N) ∈ O(N), and Ttime(N) ∈ O(N2). By having 2 key exchanges per host the linear chain network
can process 2 simultaneous secure bit exchanges as long as one host is downstream, say host i−a for any
positive integer a and the other host is upstream, say host i+b for any positive integer b of the ith host.
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The first host and the last host are special cases which cannot have simultaneous secure key exchanges
with other hosts [33].
The reliability of the linear chain network is dependent on the cable. If there is damage to the cable
then the network will become two different networks divided at the location of the damaged cable, and
the two networks cannot process a secure bit exchange with each other. The linear chain network is
more robust if there is damage to a key exchanger, then only the host with the damaged key exchanger
will be slowed down but will be able connect with all other hosts in the network since there are two key
exchangers per host.
If an additional host joins the network withN hosts then the protocol will considerN+1 hosts instead
of N , this will be a relatively simple fix as the the protocol can be preprogrammed in the hosts for any N .
Figure 4. An illustration of a linear chain network with 2 key exchangers per host has
complexities of Tcable(N) ∈ O(N), Tke(N) ∈ O(N), and Ttime(N) ∈ O(N2).
2. Results and Discussion
2.1. Star Network
The star network is a hub and spoke topology with a center switch like an old telephone exchange
switch system, and has branches connected to the center. We denote the star network protocol with
one key exchanger per host as STAR. The complexities of the star network are Tcable(N) ∈ O(N),
Tke(N) ∈ O(N), and Ttime(N) ∈ O(N). Figure 5 is an example of a star network with N branches.
Figure 5. An illustration of a star network system with one key exchanger per host has
complexities of Tcable(N) ∈ O(N), Tke(N) ∈ O(N), and Ttime(N) ∈ O(N).
The most efficient protocol in the star network is similar to the protocol in the linear chain network in
regards to first connecting to the nearest neighbors, then connecting the second nearest neighbors, and
so on. The star network allows for faster speed than the linear chain network with similar cable and
hardware complexities.
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2.2. Graph Theory and Previous Work on the Star Network
In graph theory the hosts are considered vertices and the cables are considered edges [34]. The
protocol of the star network is to connect every host in the network to process a secure bit exchange with
every other host in the network in the least number of Secure Bit Exchange Period (SBEP) steps. In graph
theory the star network protocol can be described as a special case of a edge-color problem [35] known
as round-robin(RR) tournament or all-play-all tournament problem [36]. The number k of edge colors
needed in graph theory is the number of SBEPs needed in the star network protocol, although many
geometric structures and edge-color problems have been studied in graph theory [37–43] and applied
to various infrastructure networks [44–47], it has not been applied to P2P hardware-based secure key
exchange networks other than [33]. Many network applications assume overlapping signals in the same
channel is possible, and do not have a dedicated channel in which every vertex connects with every other
vertex. For QKD and KLJN network applications these networks require dedicated communication
channels with no overlapping signals, and RR solutions to different geometric structures. The star
network protocol presented in section 2.3 is specifically for QKD and KLJN networks, and is significant
since it combines residual SBEP steps whenever possible, thus lowering the total number of SBEPs
needed, after a thorough literature review a similar RR solution was not found and the most similar
solution found is in [39].
2.3. Protocol and Analysis of the Star Network
For a network with N hosts the star key exchange network protocol begins with every odd numbered
host say ith host with i being odd and processes a secure bit exchange with their upstream nearest
neighbor, that is host i+1, this will take one Secure Bit Exchange Period (SBEP) and the secure key
exchange between different hosts will occur simultaneously. For example, host 1 will process a secure
bit exchange with host 2, while host 3 will process a secure bit exchange with host 4, while host N − 1
will process a secure bit exchange with host N if N is even, or host N − 2 will process a secure bit
exchange with host N − 1 if N is odd. If N is odd, then the last host, that is host N , will not process a
secure bit exchange in the first SBEP step. The next step in the protocol is for every even numbered host
say ith host with i being even will process a secure bit exchange with their nearest upstream neighbor, say
host i+1, simultaneously. For example, host 2 will process a secure bit exchange with host 3, while host
4 will process a secure bit exchange with host 5, while host N−1 will process a secure bit exchange with
host N if N is even, or host N will process a secure bit exchange with host 1 if N is odd, note that the
protocol will wrap around from the last host N to the first host 1. The circular nature of the star network
is a reason why it is faster than the linear chain network with similar cable and hardware complexities.
The star network protocol STAR then continues with every odd host to process a secure bit exchange
with their upstream second nearest neighbor, that is every ith host with i being odd with host i+2, then
the even numbered hosts will process a secure bit exchange with their second nearest neighbor, say every
ith host with i being even with host i+2. The protocol continues by having every host process a secure
bit exchange with their third nearest neighbors, then fourth nearest neighbors, and continues until every
host in the network has processed a secure bit exchange with every other host.
As an example Figure 6 illustrates every step of the protocol STAR for a network with 5 hosts. The
first SBEP step in the protocol is illustrated in Figure 6a, note how every odd numbered host i has a
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secure bit exchange with their next upstream nearest neighbor host i+1. The second SBEP step in the
protocol is illustrated in Figure 6b, note how every even numbered host i has a secure bit exchange
with their next upstream nearest neighbor host i+1. The third SBEP step in the protocol is illustrated in
Figure 6c. Since the number of hosts in the network is odd it will take additional SBEP steps to process
a secure bit exchange with these remaining hosts, these are residual SBEP steps. Note how the last
host wraps around to the first host. The fourth SBEP step in the protocol is illustrated in Figure 6d. In
this SBEP step every odd numbered host i has a secure bit exchange with their second upstream nearest
neighbor host i+2. The fifth SBEP step in the protocol is illustrated in Figure 6e, this step is similar to
step 4 except that now the even numbered hosts process a secure bit exchange with their second upstream
nearest neighbors. The sixth and last SBEP step in the protocol is illustrated in Figure 6f. Since N is odd
the protocol requires additional residual SBEP steps to process a secure bit exchange with the remaining
hosts. Note that for this example of the STAR protocol with N = 5 hosts requires six SBEP steps for
every host in the network to process a secure bit exchange with every host. Table 1 demonstrates what
every host is doing at every step in the protocol of this example as illustrated in Figure 6. Table 2 is the
legend for Table 1. The arrow symbol “→” is used as x → y meaning host x is processing a secure
bit exchange with host y. The star symbol “F” means the host of this row is being utilized. The circle
symbol “©” means the host of this row is not active.
(a) 1st SBEP step (b) 2nd SBEP step (c) 3rd SBEP step
(d) 4th SBEP step (e) 5th SBEP step (f) 6th SBEP step
Figure 6. An illustration of the example of the star network protocol STAR for a network
with five hosts. It takes six Secure Bit Exchange Period (SBEP) steps for every host in the
network to process a secure bit exchange with every other host.
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Table 1. This table demonstrates what every host is doing at every SBEP step in the protocol
STAR as described in the example and illustrated in Figure 6.
Host (a) 1st SBEP (b) 2nd SBEP (c) 3rd SBEP (d) 4th SBEP (e) 5th SBEP (f) 6th SBEP
1 1→ 2 © F 1→ 3 F ©
2 F 2→ 3 © 2→ 4 © F
3 3→ 4 F © F 3→ 5 ©
4 F 4→ 5 © F 4→ 1 ©
5 © F 5→ 1 © F 5→ 2
Table 2. This table is the legend of Table 1.
Symbol Meaning of symbols in Table 1
x→ y Host x processing a secure bit exchange with host y.
F Host of this row is being utilized.
© Host of this row is inactive.
Table 3. This table shows the number of SBEPs needed in star networks with 2 hosts to 20
hosts, with every host in the network to process a secure bit exchange with every other host.
N , number of hosts in star network SBEP(N ), number of SBEP steps
needed for a network with N hosts
2 1
3 3
4 3
5 6
6 6
7 8
8 8
9 12
10 12
11 14
12 14
13 17
14 17
15 19
16 19
17 22
18 22
19 24
20 24
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The number of SBEPs needed in the STAR protocol is dependent on the number of hosts N in the
network. Table 3 shows the number of SBEPs needed in the star network for every host to process a
secure bit exchange with every other host in the network, for star networks with up to 20 hosts. Figure 7
is the plot of Table 3, withN being the independent variable and SBEP being the dependent variable. The
linear regression line is f(N) = 1.3192982456 ·N − 1.301754386, and the coefficient of determination
is R2 = 0.988989157.
The patterns and relations in the star network protocol can be seen in Table 3 and Figure 7. Note that
when N is evenly divisible by 2 then it will take exactly 2 SBEP steps for every host i to process a secure
bit exchange with their nearest neighbor host i+1. If N is not evenly divisible by 2 then it will take
exactly 3 SBEP steps for every host i to process a secure bit exchange with their nearest neighbor host
i+1. The results are the same for every case when N is divided by 3, 4, 5, ..., (N − 1)/2, and every host
i processes a secure bit exchange with their second, third, fourth, ..., (N − 2)/2th nearest neighbor, that
is host i+2, i+3, i+4, ..., i+(N − 2) respectively. There is a unique case when N is even and is divided
by N/2, in this case only one SBEP step is needed to process a secure bit exchange. The residual steps
are combined whenever possible. For example, in the case when N = 7, the 6th and 9th steps can
be combined into one step resulting in one less SBEP step. These patterns and relations were used to
conceive Equations (1a) through (1d), where the “de” symbol in the equations is the ceiling function, N
is the number of hosts and SBEP(N) is the number of SBEPs needed to share an independent secure bit
for each possible pairs formed in the network, which means each host share N − 1 secure bits. (Note,
after this sharing, each possible pairs formed in the network has only a single bit of their respective
secure key. Thus to share a key with k bits, the above process must be repeated k times.)
Figure 7. This is the plot of Table 3. The data points are plotted along with a linear regression
line which is f(N) = 1.3192982456 ·N−1.301754386, and the coefficient of determination
is R2 = 0.988989157. The horizontal axis is N meaning the number of hosts in the star
network. The vertical axis is SBEP(N ) meaning the number of SBEP steps needed for a
network with N hosts.
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SBEP(N) = N +
⌈
N
4
⌉
− 2 for N ≤ 8 and N is even. (1a)
SBEP(N) = N +
⌈
N
4
⌉
− 1 for N ≤ 8 and N is odd. (1b)
SBEP(N) = N +
⌈
N
4
⌉
− 1 for N > 8 and N is even. (1c)
SBEP(N) = N +
⌈
N
4
⌉
for N > 8 and N is odd. (1d)
The reliability of the star network is dependent on its center switch, cable, and key exchanger. One
could sabotage the entire network just by damaging the center switch in the star network. If a cable or key
exchanger is damaged in the star network then the affected host will be effectively disconnected from the
entire network, but the unaffected hosts will be able to continue processing a secure bit exchange with
other hosts in the network.
To add additional hosts in the star network will require every hosts in the network to change the
protocol fromN toN+1, which is a relatively simple process since the protocols can be preprogrammed
in the hosts.
The star network could be utilized in many situations including vehicle information networks [48,49]
and inside equipment with components spread around a central processing unit such as a computer.
2.4. Comparing Network Topologies
Table 4 compares the fully connected network with N − 1 key exchangers per host denoted by
FCNN−1, the fully connected network with 1 key exchanger per host denoted by FCN1, the linear chain
network protocol with 2 key exchangers per hosts is denoted by LCH, and the star network protocol
with 1 communicator per host denoted by STAR. As can be seen from Table 4 the fastest network is
the FCNN−1 network, the networks with the least cost of cables are the linear chain network and the
star network, and the networks with the least cost of key exchangers are FCN1, linear chain network,
and star network. These results will hold for both KLJN and QKD systems. These results show that the
star network has better performance than the linear chain network with similar cost of cables and key
exchangers.
Table 4. This table summarizes the complexities of the fully connected networks FCNN−1
and FCN1, the linear chain network protocol LCH, and the star network protocol STAR.
Network type Tcable(N) Tke(N) Ttime(N)
FCNN−1 O(N2) O(N2) O(1)
FCN1 O(N
2) O(N) O(N)
LCH O(N) O(N) O(N2)
STAR O(N) O(N) O(N)
The robustness and reliability of each network is dependent on its geometric topology. If a cable is
damaged then it is best to have a FCNN−1 network since only one connection between two hosts will
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be lost. In the linear chain network the entire network will be divided. In the star network the affected
host will be completely disconnected from the network. If a key exchanger is damaged then it is best to
have a linear chain network since the only consequences will be a slower secure bit exchange process,
but every host will still be able to process a secure bit exchange with every other host. In the FCNN−1
network a damaged key exchanger will only affect one connection between two hosts. In the star network
a damaged key exchanger will completely disconnect the affected host from the entire network. Another
weakness of the star network is the center switch, if the center switch is damaged then the entire network
is disconnected. Based on these three networks one can argue that the most robust reliable network is
the FCNN−1 followed by the linear chain network, and the least robust network of these three would be
the star network.
To add hosts to the FCNN−1 network would be trivial since the FCNN−1 does need a protocol, all
that is needed is to connect the host to every other host. To add hosts to the linear chain network and the
star network will require every hosts in the network to change the protocol from N hosts to N + 1 hosts,
this will be a relatively simple process as every host can be preprogrammed.
2.5. Open Questions and Future Studies
The star network has complexity of O(N) for the number of cables, key exchangers, and time, but
there are still numerous other geometric network topologies that have not been explored that might
benefit KLJN and QKD systems. Other examples for possible networks include matrix networks, that is
a grid of several vertical lines and horizontal lines. The matrix network might be a good model for an
urban city with squared blocks. A wheel network is another possibility that might outperform the star
network. A wheel network is similar to a star network but with a connecting loop around the branches.
A web network is another interesting network similar to the wheel network but with concentric circles
connecting the inner branches. A web network is similar to a spider web with each node being a host.
A cube network is another interesting possibility that could be utilized in a skyscraper. A cube network
is similar to the matrix network except that it is three dimensions. A sphere network might be another
interesting three-dimensional network that can be compared with the cube network.
Since different geometrical topologies give different trade-offs, another interest is to explore the
trade-offs of the different networks, and why it is preferable to sacrifice speed, communicators, or key
exchangers for infrastructure and vice versa. Another possible interest is to analyze and compare every
geometric network with different number of communicators and how well they scale with speed. Another
possibility is to combine several of these networks into one network and analyze its performance, in
graph theory this is known as hybrid networks.
Different geometic network structures have different vulnerabilites, an analysis of each network’s
vulnerabilites, robustness, reliability, and different kinds of attacks would be interesting to explore
and compare.
3. Conclusions
In this study we considered the need for unconditional secure key exchange along with the need to
have P2P networks since QKD and KLJN require P2P networks. We reviewed a simple P2P network
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known as the fully connected network. We also reviewed the linear chain network and analyzed the star
network to compared it with fully connected networks and the linear chain network. We conceived a
protocol and Equations (1a) through (1d) to describe the star network. The results show that the star
network compares favorably to the linear chain network and the fully connected network. Even though
the star network utilizes only one key exchanger per host, its time complexity is superior to that of
the linear chain network, while its cable complexity is the same. The star network’s cable and key
exchanger complexity is superior to that of the fully connected network, while its time complexity is
worse than FCNN−1, but is similar to FCN1. We found that the star network fairs worse than the linear
chain network and the fully connected network in robustness and reliability as the star network can be
entirely disconnected by damaging the center switch. We then considered several other possible network
geometries that might be interesting to explore and to compare.
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